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"act."24 The defendant is not a mere supplier of a commodity; this news-
paper is an essential link between the plaintiff and his prospective customers,
and the nature of the defendant's business is such that even so-called "non-
feasance" on his part will have an effect on the business decisions of pros-
pective land buyers. The refusal to run an advertisement which has cus-
tomarily appeared might be considered a form of persuasion.
The American Law Institute expresses no opinion as to liability in
circumstances covered by the exceptions to section 762. 25 It is safe to
assume that the Institute took. this position because of the scarcity of case
law on the issue of how far the prima facie tort doctrine has extended into
this refusal to deal area. Had the plaintiff marshalled his facts and framed
his declaration on a prima fade tort theory, however, it would seem that this
court would, at least, have been required to discuss the area" and it could
not have dismissed the case as an ordinary "refusal to deal."
H. WAYNE JUDGE
Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—State Occupation Tax as
Measured by Gross Receipts.—Washington-Oregon Shippers Coop.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Schumaker.i—Respondent, Washington-Oregon Shippers
Coop. Ass'n, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as WOSCA), a non-profit corpora-
tion• domiciled in the state of Washington, was formed to gain the advantages
of carload or volume rates for its members 3 by providing services to con-
solidate shipments. As each member is engaged in a business involving the
purchase and transportation of products from extra-state sources, WOSCA
handles only interstate shipments.
Shipping procedure is as follows: the out of state vendor, upon receiv-
ing an order from a purchasing member of WOSCA, ships the commodities
in care of WOSCA to consolidators who arrange the commodities in carload
lots and ship them to Washington distributors. The latter segregate the
shipments and make delivery to the purchasing members. Another contrac-
tor, who pays the carriers and others out of WOSCA's operating capital as
24 See Legislation, supra note 9, at 692.
25 Restatement, op. cit. supra note 8, § 762, caveat.
26 It may be, then, that courts, even without the aid of statutes, will be more
disposed than they were previously to scrutinize the motive of the intentional
infliction of harm by non-feasance, as well as by affirmative acts. They may
perhaps place legal limits on bargaining power when it is based on a corpora-
tion's threat of non-feasance in the form of a refusal to buy, sell or employ as
well as when it is based on a. threat by individual workers to do the affimative
act of combining, followed by the non-feasance of a refusal to work.
Hale, supra note 10, at 217.
1 367 P.2d 112 (Wash. 1961).
2 WOSCA is exempt from regulation by the ICC as a freight forwarder under 56
Stat. 284 (1942), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1002(c) (1958).
8 Corporate membership consists of 119 business entities, with principal places of




charges come due, then bills the individual members for the services per-
formed by WOSCA. 4 All consolidators and distributors, and the contractor,
are under contract with WOSCA.
The state of Washington levied an occupation tax on WOSCA, using as
its basis the gross receipts received from the members for services per-
formed. 5 The superior court found the taxes to be a direct burden on inter-
state commerce and enjoined their collection. The Tax Commissioner,
abandoning his claim that the actual transportation charges by carriers
should be included in the measure of the tax, limited its appeal to that por-
tion of the trial court's judgment that enjoined collection of taxes measured
by gross receipts obtained from members for services rendered to them by
WOSCA. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed.° HELD:
The tax did not place an extra burden on interstate commerce not borne by
intrastate commerce, nor did it create the risk of multiple exactions of the
same nature from other states.
From the beginning of our constitutional system it has been a recog-
nized principle that the free flow of commerce between the states may not
be burdened by any form of state taxation.? However, the reports are
replete with decisions involving state attempts to breach or by-pass the
barrier of immunity surrounding those engaged in interstate activity. The
attacks have come on three fronts: income or license taxes arising out of
gross or net income; franchise and privilege taxes based upon the privilege
of doing business within the taxing state; and property taxes imposed upon
the property used within the taxing state. 8
Traditionally, a tax was struck down when its effect on interstate com-
merce was held to be "direct"9 and was upheld when the effect was only
4 A per hundredweight charge was placed on the following items: loading and
consolidation; railroad stop-off ; all-risk insurance; WOSCA overhead; administration
and billing; unloading and segregation; store-door delivery.
5 There is levied and shall be collected from every person a tax for the act or
privilege of engaging in business activities. Such tax shall be measured by the applica-
tion of rates against value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the
business, as the case may be. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 82.04.220 (1961).
8 The railroad stop-off charge was exempted from the measure of the tax on the
grounds that it was inseparable from the actual transportation charges of carriers.
I See, e.g., Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); Brennan v.
Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894) ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Rob-
bins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) ; State Freight Tax Cases, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872) ; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
8 There are innumerable articles on this general topic, tracing the historical de-
velopment of these categories of state taxation. The following are of particular interest:
Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce (1953); Barrett, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce—"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?,
4 Vand. L. Rev. 496 (1951); Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—What
Now?, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 899 (1950); Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Au-
thority by the Taxing Powers of the States, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 572, 721, 932 (1921) ;
Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 Harv, L. Rev. 501, 710 (1947); and
see a Symposium, State Taxation of Multistate Business, 18 Ohio St. L. j. 3, 9, 22, 43,
57, 69, 84 (1957).
9 See, e.g., Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917) ; Western Union
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"indirect." 10 Thus gross receipts taxes were among those that fell by the
interstate roadside under this standard." However, cases of more recent
vintage seem to permit gross receipts taxes if they are either apportioned to
intrastate activity" or incapable of duplication by any other state." The
requirement of apportioning gross receipts from interstate commerce among
the states is analogous to the requirement in the property cases, where, in
addition to the commerce clause, due process prevents taxation of extra-
territorial values." Thus gross receipts or gross income taxes may be re-
garded as essentially in rem as compared with the net income taxes which
may have a personal basis." On the one hand, the net income tax cases
allow a state to reach all net income of its residents, including that arising
from activities beyond its borders although those activities are as a matter
of due process beyond the taxing power of the state." On the other hand,
a gross receipts tax, including receipts from interstate commerce, will be
upheld only if the taxpayer's activities occur in the taxing state."
In recent years there has been a wealth of decisions where the courts
have upheld franchise and business privilege taxes measured by gross income
when the taxpayer was engaged in substantial local business activities which
were not deemed to be an integral part of interstate activity." However,
where the courts found the local activity inseparable from interstate activity,
the validity of the tax has been denied, on the basis that a state may not
Tel. Co. v, Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, supra
note 7.
to See, e.g., Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935); Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
11 see, e.g., United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918), where a
gross receipts tax was held to impose a direct and immediate burden on commerce be-
cause it was imposed without reference to the profitability of the business and hence
might so diminish the profit as to impede interstate commerce.
12 See Illinois Central R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940). For apportionment
formulas used and approved in income taxation see, Bass, Ratcliffe & Gretton, Ltd. v.
State Tax Comm'r, 266 U.S. 271 (1924) ; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 US. 113 (1920). For a formula disproved, see Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North
Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
is See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) ;
Gwin, White and Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) ; Western Livestock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). But cf. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249
(1946), where Mr. Justice Frankfurter repudiated the multiple taxation test.
14 Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904).
15 See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Virginia, 307 U.S. 247 (1938) ; New York
ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) ; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'r, 286 US.
276 (1932).
10 See note 15 supra. Non-residents can only be taxed upon receipt of income
from sources within the state, Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, supra note 12.
17 Sec Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938) ; Compania
Gen. de Tobacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87 (1927).
18
 See, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) ; Eastern Air
Transp., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'r, 285 U.S. 147 (1932) ; Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Doughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923). The theory of a separate intrastate event has
found its greatest application in the field of use taxes—see, e.g., Nelson v. Sears Roe-
buck Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) ; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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grant the privilege of engaging in interstate activity and therefore may not
tax such privilege. 18
 But not all cases are clear-cut, nor are the activities
susceptible of disection. 2°' The instant case is a striking example of the
dilemma.
The court properly disposed of the due process question in holding that
the activity of procuring services is a local activity which may form the sub-
ject of state taxation, albeit, that such services are rendered in connection
with an interstate transaction. However, the balance of the opinion, leaves
much to be desired. In an attempt to add more revenue to the state coffers,
the Washington court dismissed the commerce clause implications of Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commissioner2' and Gwin White and Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford22 as not controlling in the instant situation. The former
case held that a stevedoring business was subject to the Washington business
and occupation tax when it merely supplied workmen to the shipowner, but
was not taxable where it directed the work of loading and unloading itself.
The approach taken was to determine how closely the taxpayer's business
activities were associated with interstate commerce—the latter instance be-
ing enough to provide protection. Applying the Puget standard to the in-
stant case, it would appear that contractual control over those who provide
the actual physical labor should be sufficient to provide the "nexus" neces-
sary for tax immunity.
In Gwin, the taxpayer was a Washington corporation whose entire busi-
ness was that of "marketing agent" for fruit growers in Washington and
Oregon. The taxpayer made sales and deliveries of fruit in other states, col-
lected the sales price and remitted the proceeds to its principals after deduct-
ing transportation charges and its own compensation. That case is somewhat
similar to the case at hand, yet the Gwin court in holding the tax levy as
unconstitutional did not consider which of the taxpayer's activities were in
themselves transportation of the fruit in interstate commerce:
For the entire service for which the compensation is paid is in aid
of the shipment and sale of merchandise in that commerce. Such
services are within the protection of the commerce clause. 23
It is submitted that as WOSCA's services might best be characterized as
facilitating the movement of goods in interstate commerce only, not both
transportation and sale, such services are so closely connected with main-
taining the free flow of commerce among the states as to be considered as
actually engaging in interstate activity.
It would appear that the instant forum, faced with the fact that a tax
19 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1950) ; Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925) ; Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Phila-
delphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903).
20 Compare the following: Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S.
422 (1947) ; Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) ;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
21 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
22 supra note 13.
23 Supra note 13, at 437.
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on the privilege of doing an exclusively interstate business would have to be
invalidated, resorted to the use of an "old friend"—Iegal fiction—previously
used in the Memphis Gas case 24 There the taxpayer was operating an inter-
state pipeline which, the state conceded, was an exclusively interstate busi-
ness. Despite the language of the state statute which imposed the levy on
"doing business" in the state, the Mississippi court held nevertheless that
the tax was not levied on doing business, but instead on the local activities
in maintaining the pipeline which the court opined to be subject to tax.
In a five to four decision the United States Supreme Court upheld the tax
as a levy on "local activities" rather than a tax on the "privilege of doing
interstate business."25
 Thus in the case at hand, the Washington court, by
placing a "local activities" label on the privilege tax, 28
 has attempted to use
the escape device provided in the Memphis Gas case, so as to avoid the
implications of Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor. 27 Spector in effect
reiterated the well settled principle, which was even recognized by Mr.
Justice Reed in Memphis Gas, that a state may not tax the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce.
However, label changing does not dispose of the case. All that is settled
(if the court's view is adopted) is that the Washington statute is not a
tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate activity but merely a tax on
local activity. Even Mr.' Justice Reed recognized that it is not enough to
find any "local activity" to which to attach a tax for there "are always con-
venient local incidents in every interstate operation." 28
 His views mirror
the sentiments of Mr. Justice Rutledge in an earlier decision:
If the only thing necessary to sustain a state tax . . were to
discover some local incident which might be regarded as separate
and distinct from . . . the commerce itself . . . all interstate
commerce could be subjected to state taxation . . . . AlI interstate
commerce takes place within the confines of the states and neces-
sarily involves "incidents" occurring within each state through which
it passes . . and there is no known limit to the human mind's
capacity to carve out from what is an entire or integral economic
process particular phases or incidents, label them as "separate and
distinct" or "local" and thus achieve its desired resuIt. 28
24
 Stone v. Memphis Natural Gas Co., 201 Miss. 670, 29 S.2d 268 (1947).
25 Supra note 18.
26
 The tax involved herein is not a tax on the privilege of doing interstate
business; so Spector Motor Service is distinguishable. • .. But a local cor-
poration, organized under the laws of Washington, performing local activ-
ities and serving local establishments is subject to the tax.
Supra note 1, at 117. However, the very same Washington court had previously said,
. . . [T]he business and occupational tax contained in the state revenue
act imposes, indiscriminately, an excise tax upon every person for the priv-
ilege of doing business in this state.
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'r, 189 Wash. 131, 135, 63 P.2d 532, 533 (1937).
27 Supra note 19.
28 Supra note 18, at 87.
29 Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423 (1946).
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It is submitted that too often judicial metaphysics is the basis upon
which the taxing power of a state is made to stand or fall, rather than the
economic and fiscal realities of the situation. The decision at hand is a
prime example of such an uneconomic result. By upholding the validity of
the Washington levy, the instant court has subjected interstate commerce
to the burden of paying the Washington business and occupation tax on the
gross revenue of such organizations as WOSCA, over and above the tax
paid by the various independent contractors doing the actual loading, un-
loading, and segregation. It must be remembered that WOSCA is a non-
profit organization and, therefore, any imposition cannot be absorbed, but
must be passed directly and fully to purchasing members by increasing the
costs of the interstate shipments.
STUART R. Ross
Corporations—Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Capital Stock—
Business Judgment Rule.--Propp v. Sadacca. 1 —Textron, Inc., sought to
gain control of American Screw Company, a company in which Noma Lites,
Inc., held a substantial interest. Textron was unsuccessful because Noma,
through the efforts of one Sadacca, the chairman of the board of directors
of Noma, bought enough stock to insure its control. The chairman of
Textron2
 then informed Sadacca that, though Textron could not gain con-
trol of American directly, it could acquire it indirectly by gaining control
of Noma, and that it was prepared so to do. Sadacca then purchased on the
open market on November 24 and 26, 1958, 199,000 shares of Noma com-
mon stock. These purchases of Noma stock were made with the purpose of
preventing this acquisition of control by Textron, and without the knowledge
or consent of the president or directors of Noma. Three days later, at a
special meeting of the board of directors, Sadacca's purchase was ratified
and financing arranged. This took place in the approximate time of three
and one-half hours. Plaintiff, a shareholder of Noma, brought this action for
an accounting. HELD: The business judgment rule is no defense where
the purchase and ratification were made in a "precipitate and impulsive
manner" without due and careful consideration of the problems involved.
A Delaware corporation may purchase shares of its own capital stock
unless such purchase will impair the capital of the corporation. 3
 In the
instant case the question of capital impairment apparently was not raised.
No determination was made by the court whether this purchase did or did
not, in fact, impair the capital. The main issue presented, then, was the
extent to which the business judgment rule precluded judicial inquiry into
corporate decisions. The court reasoned that although a corporation has a
1 175 A.2d 33 (Del. Ch. 1961).
2 Chairman of Textron at that time was Mr. Royal Little, whom defendant claims
was a "known liquidator."
3
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 160 (1953); In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del.
Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255 (1914).
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